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Abstract 
Substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made with respect to agenda-
setting as a determinant for policy outcomes. An actor-centred perspective on frames and 
venues is core to this literature, structure as a single standing category has received less 
attention. In this paper we argue that these results should be combined with bureaucratic 
politics in the European Commission to further our understanding of agenda setting 
processes in the European Union.  
Typically, a legislative proposal of the Commission is produced by a lead department which 
collaborates with a number of other departments on a partly formalized basis before a joint 
Commission decision is taken. Different services hold different positions on specific policies. 
We show that structures and rules governing the process yield the potential for some 
positions to be systematically more strongly represented in the proposals entering inter-
institutional decision-making. We complement our argument by providing evidence of 
interaction patterns when it comes to internal coordination. 
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The agenda set by the EU Commission:  
the result of balanced or biased 
aggregation of positions? 
 
1. Introduction 
Within the policy-making process the agenda-setting phase has recently seen much 
scholarly attention as an important determinant for policy outcomes. For the EU 
political system substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made 
(Princen, 2009; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008). So far 
agenda-setting is primarily explained by the interplay between venues and framing. 
Venues are understood as distinct institutional arenas that define which actors get 
involved into an issue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Frames refer to schemes of 
interpretation with which a particular issue is attached to extant conflict lines thus 
amplifying specific interest at the expense of others (e.g. Daviter, 2009: 1118). Thus, 
the theoretical focus lies on how strategic actors actively move issues to favorable 
decision-making venues thereby drawing on existing or newly created frames that 
further their interest (Princen, 2009). Structure as a single standing category seems to 
be the poor cousin in this literature and if addressed it is easily subsumed under the 
institutional dimension of ‘venue’. “Bureaucratic politics” (Allison, 1969; Hammond, 
1986), however, are typically of little particular concern.  
In this paper we do not argue against an actor centred perspective. Rather we claim 
that complementing this approach with bureaucratic politics in the European 
Commission will further our understanding of agenda setting processes in legislative 
decision making of the European Union. Hereby we bring together two strands of 
recent research that emphasizes the value of a disaggregated view of the 
Commission to explain EU policy making. First, organisational theorists analyse how 
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the internal departmentalization influences the individual positions of the internal 
actors and leads to conflicts within the Commission (e.g. Trondal et al., 2009; see also 
Egeberg, 2006a). Second, EU agenda-setting literature stresses the multiple venues 
the Commission’s internal fragmentation provides for political actors to upload their 
preferred choices to the EU agenda (e.g. Harcourt, 1998; Mörth, 2000; Princen and 
Rhinard, 2006). This research is primarily interested in explaining individual 
positions and the strategic use that can be made of structure. We view the internal 
fragmentation as a precondition for our broader argument, which is that the existing 
rules and structures coordinating different positions systematically favour certain 
actors and therewith positions over others. 
Our approach rests on two assumptions. First, under the umbrella of the European 
Commission different Directorates General and services (DGs) need to act together. 
Importantly, they must be expected to hold different positions, e.g. based on frames, 
perceptions or mandates. Therefore, second, issues and positions on legislative acts 
do not emerge endogenously but are the outcome of a set of actor choices which are 
aggregated by institutional structures. To be sure, structures do not pre-determine 
outcomes, but render some actor behaviour more likely than other (Scharpf, 1997). 
Looking at the internal process leading to the final legislative proposal by the 
Commission, we show how some internal actors’ positions are more likely to be 
adopted than others’. Disregarding the influence of organisational structure and 
institutional rules on position formation within the Commission may ultimately lead 
to incorrect conclusions on final legislative outcomes.1 We are interested in 
understanding whether the Commission’s position is the result of an averaging out 
of different internal positions or whether the internal organisational structure 
renders some issues more likely to be adopted by the European Commissioners in a 
                                                        
1 Only where we take structure into account can we fully understand the conditions under which 
changes in the position with which the inter-institutional process starts are possible. What is 
more, the choice of inter-institutional settings, such as relevant Council formations or 
parliamentary committees typically arise from interaction within the Commission (Hartlapp, 
2010, forthcoming). And, how issues are asserted in the internal process influences the degree of 
conflict or the interaction modus of actors involved in the inter-institutional process (e.g. 
Fouilleux et al., 2005). 
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specific form rather than in another. In other words: Is the agenda set by the 
Commission the result of balanced or biased aggregation? 
The argument presented in this paper rests on an author collected data base on the 
European Commission and on 127 semi structured expert interviews conducted with 
officials in Brussels from May to December 2009.2 These interviews cover officials 
responsible for drafting proposals, more high ranking officials involved in the 
successive steps of the process (Directors-General, Cabinet members and 
Commissioners), as well as officials from the coordinating units in the Secretariat-
General. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next chapter we discuss divergences in the 
characteristics of internal Commission actors related to the process of position 
formation (2). We then uncover the organisational lines providing for the structure of 
the internal processes of position formation within the EU Commission (3). Mapping 
empirical variation in position formation on different dimensions will substantiate 
our argument (4). We conclude by discussing implications and related questions that 
will guide the further analysis (5). 
 
2. A multitude of internal Commission actors 
This section provides some descriptive evidence indicating that the preparation of 
legislative proposals involves a range of actors which differ along several 
dimensions. They follow different logics of legislative action, represent diverging 
outside interests and stakeholders, and vary in their involvement in the production 
of European legislation – thereby allowing for a multitude of competing frames 
(Schön and Rein, 1994; for the Commission: Mörth, 2000; cf. also Princen, 2009: 362). 
                                                        
2 In order to preserve anonymity, we refer to these as “interview COM 001”, “interview COM 
002”, etc. 
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2.1. Mandates of internal actors 
Much of the substantial work of policy formulation is done at the administrative 
level which itself is divided into 40 individual sub-organisations. Even the most basic 
characteristics of these so-called Directorates-General and services (DGs) indicate 
that the way any given policy problem is approached will vary along these 
organisational boundaries (cf. also Trondal et al., 2009). 
Consider table 1 below which presents a snapshot of the different Commission 
departments in 2008.3 Initially, even a quick review of the policy mandates in column 
two provides for a large variance in the breadth and specificity of the different 
portfolios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Some more technical services are left out from presentation: the offices for translation, 
interpretation, publication, infrastructure, informatics, data protection, and the payment of 
individual entitlements, as well as the Bureau of European Policy Advisers, the Bureau for 
Humanitarian Aid as well as the Joint Research Centre. 
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Table 1: Internal Commission actors in 2008 
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Within the family of services with internal policy responsibilities,4 we find some 
candidates with a sectoral focus like TREN for transport and energy or AGRI for 
agriculture, but also DGs with horizontal mandates. The mandate of DG MARKT, for 
example, lies in the creation and maintenance of the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and persons. This mandate is not limited to specific policy areas so that 
MARKT initiatives, for example, will often cross-cut with one of the more sectoral 
responsibilities of other DGs. Comparable interdependencies can be found for almost 
all services of the Commission. 
While it creates scope for conflicts of interest, the portfolio segmentation should also 
lead to varying problem perceptions, solution concepts or frames with regard to 
particular legislative acts. In line with more technocratic or functionalist approaches 
to sectoral decision-making, we may expect variances in problem definition, solution 
templates, and measurement of regulatory success across services (Egeberg, 1995). In 
order to set the agenda for further European decision making, these different 
perspectives must be accommodated for which in turn the internal coordination 
structures of the Commission provide the only possible route. 
 
2.2. Administrative setup 
Varying preferences on a specific legislative problem can be further underlined by 
differences in the organisational setup (table 1). The most pronounced variance is 
found if we consider the budgets of the individual organisational units. The third 
column shows the overall payments a DG was entitled to in 2008. Unsurprisingly, 
the clear frontrunner is the Directorate General for Agriculture. On the other end of 
the continuum we find the services responsible for the internal market (MARKT), for 
competition (COMP), and for external trade relationships (TRADE), their respective 
annual payments represent even less than 0.15% of DG AGRI’s overall spending. 
                                                        
4 The classification into policy, external relations and horizontal services is first and foremost 
meant to assist the reader in structuring the large amounts of descriptive data provided.  
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Possible policy consequences of this budgetary variance among DGs become more 
visible if we consider how the money is spent by the different departments. Column 
four provides the share of its overall budget a DG uses on purely administrative 
entries. Again, the spread among the policy-oriented DGs is wide: While some DGs 
clearly focus on distributive tasks, others operate in a purely regulatory mode. In 
assuming that ‘policies determine politics’ (Lowi, 1964; 1972), we should expect 
considerable divergences in the way different societal interests are represented and 
how policy problems are identified, approached and framed accordingly. 
As a final administrative parameter, the DGs differ notably with regard to 
manpower. Differences in staff figures do not simply mirror the variance in budgets 
or implementing tasks. Rather, we find disproportionate staff figures which all in all 
correlate only weakly with the total DG budget (.34 across all services shown) and 
the share of administrative expenditures (-.20). These figures suggest that internal 
Commission actors differ with regard to the available human resources they can 
invest in any given policy formulation process. 
Like the mandates outlined above, also the administrative setup of actors within the 
Commission poses varying hurdles and opportunities for interest aggregation. 
Different actors work along different policy modes in the regulative vs. distributive 
dimension and enter legislative drafting with varying levels of administrative 
resources available. This provides further anchor points in understanding how its 
different internal actors may influence the agenda set by the European Commission. 
 
2.3. Administrative and political leadership 
Moving beyond purely administrative input and output data, other possible sources 
for varying positions within the Commission rest with the administrative and 
political leadership of individual DGs (see table 1, panel 3). With regard to 
administrative responsibility and coordination, each DG is headed by a Director-
General, awarded largely on merit-based criteria. However, the influential position 
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and the limited number of these posts make their distribution also subject to political 
considerations (Spence, 2006b).5 Looking at the nationality distribution in 2008, we 
find it limited to ten member states. Countries from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
are excluded completely and the largest members of the EU-15 are represented 
strongest at this level of action (FR: 5, UK: 4; DE, ES, and IT: 3).  
For the formation of the ultimate Commission agenda, its political leadership – 
where the power of the final decision rests – is even more important. Though the 
Code of Conduct swears Commissioners in to impartiality, the scope for party 
politics in the College can hardly be denied (interviews COM 057, 058, 094): 
Commissioner posts are occupied by professional and experienced politicians who 
most often passed through party political careers in their home countries and 
increasingly often resume these careers after their Commission term (Wonka, 2007; 
Döring, 2007). 
To capture the scope of possible conflicts along party lines, the final column of table 1 
provides the political group to which the national party of each Commissioner is 
assigned to in the European Parliament. According to this measure, the 2008 College 
is dominated by conservative party members (EPP: 10), followed by liberals (ALDE: 
8) and socialists (PES: 6). As it is known from national debates, even these rather 
crude characteristics may lead to vastly different positions in practical politics. And 
the scope for political conflict in the Commission becomes even more visible if we 
consider individual dimensions of party conflict, e.g. with respect to dimensions 
such as ‘market regulation’ or ‘welfare state’. Depending on the issue at stake, we 
must expect different distributions of proponents and adversaries of specific policy 
positions in the College. In conclusion, the leadership level might be a gateway along 
which further dimensions of conflict enter the agenda setting phase within the 
Commission. 
                                                        
5 Especially national interest is a concern and accordance between the nationality of the Director-
General and the Commissioner is prohibited since the inception of the Prodi Commission 
(Kassim, 2004). 
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This descriptive overview shows that the internal Commission actors vary in 
mandates, their administrative setup and resources, and in the characteristics of the 
administrative and political leaders. Actors within the institution and their positions 
are too diverse to simply assume a particular Commission agenda. Rather, the 
presented facts let us expect conflicts of interest, varying frames and differing 
powers to influence the final Commission’s agenda. In consequence, we need to 
understand which processes and organisational structures and rules help to 
overcome conflict and how they lead to the aggregation of positions. 
 
3. Rules and structures coordinating differing positions 
Due to the multitude of internal actors and positions constant coordination is 
indispensible for the European Commission to form a common position on 
legislative proposals. Coordination essentially takes place at two organisational 
levels within the Commission: 1) on the administrative level among the DGs and 
services, and 2) on the political level among the Commissioners and their Cabinets. 
The process of position formation is structured in different coordinative steps and is 
paralleled by vertical exchanges between the two levels (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Coordinative steps of position formation in the EU Commission 
 
 
3.1. Administrative coordination 
The administrative coordination consists of mainly two parts: a more informal phase 
of DG interaction and the formal, written ‘inter-service consultation’ (ISC) via the 
database CIS-Net.6 It is largely up to the lead department in how far it already 
coordinates with other DGs in the informal stage. However, this phase is getting 
increasingly more formalised with ‘inter-service groups’ more and more encouraged 
by the Secretariat General (SG, interviews COM 057, 092, 113). In addition, the 
introduction of the ‘impact assessment’ (IA) can be seen as a major contribution to 
more active and early coordination among the services (Schout and Jordan, 2008; 
Tholoniat, 2009, also interviews COM 033, 075, 118). Gradually introduced from 2003 
on, today an IA accompanying all major legislative proposals is compulsory. Since 
                                                        
6 Before the actual administrative coordination of a legislative proposal starts, one DG is assigned 
lead department primarily in charge of the act, a procedure cutting cross the two introduced 
organisational levels, (cf. sec. 3.1.2). 
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2006 it is fully operational with an Impact Assessment Board (IAB) controlling the 
quality of the IA.7 Although there is no direct link to the process of position 
formation we note that IAs often require early interaction, especially with other DGs 
e.g. in the regular Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG, interviews COM 057, 
075, 092, 118). Thereby it increases awareness for potential later conflicts and has a 
positive impact on the smoothness of later interactions. One may even argue that 
they provide the DGs that are represented in the IAB with considerable insight and 
influence on proposals from other areas. After informal coordination the legislative 
proposal goes up the ladder of competences to the Commissioner and his / her 
Cabinet with the request to agree to inter-service consultation (ISC), the formal part 
of administrative coordination. 
The ISC then starts with the lead department feeding its draft proposal into the 
electronic document base ‘CIS-Net’, a procedure mandatory since April 2001. Via the 
CIS-Net the lead DG must consult all “concerned” DGs for approval (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008: 5). Which DGs are considered as ‘concerned’, 
however, is up to the judgement of the lead DG and leaves room for strategic 
considerations and coalition building (interview COM 057, 118). The involvement of 
the internal horizontal services in contrast is more narrowly specified. Consultation 
is obligatory for the SG, plus for the Legal Service where legislative acts are 
concerned. Further, the approval of the DGs for Personnel and Administration 
(ADMIN), Budget (BUDG), Communication (COMM) and the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) are obligatory in certain cases (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008: 5).  
The addressed services have to respond within a given time frame, mostly around 
four weeks. They have the possibility to give three kinds of opinions: 1) agreement, 
2) agreement with comments, or 3) a disapproving ‘avis négatif’. The agreement with 
comments is considered the most frequent kind of response by DGs (interview COM 
                                                        
7 The IAB is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General responsible for ‘Better Regulation’, and 
consists of “one permanent official at Director level from the Directorates-General with the most 
direct expertise in the three broad dimensions – economic, social and environmental – of 
integrated impact assessment (DG ECFIN, DG EMPL, DG ENTR, DG ENV)” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006: Art. 1). 
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046). It obliges the lead department to draft in the comments of the other services or 
to attach them as open points to the proposal. In practice the consideration of the 
others’ comments by the lead department is a matter of trust, with defaults most 
certainly being detected at later stages (interviews COM 015, 115). In contrast a 
disapproving ‘negative opinion’ is a break in the system with significant impacts on 
further steps (interview COM 066).8 If the parties cannot reach an agreement on the 
given text, the lead DG can either take back its proposal and draft a new text; or, the 
open points are handed up to the political level, i.e. the Cabinet, in order for them to 
find a solution. Regarding the frequency of handing in a negative opinion a SG 
official notes substantial differences among DGs, with some rarely handing in a ‘non’ 
while others take this road quite often (interview COM 015). 
The organisational structures of internal coordination set strong incentives for the SG 
and the other services to have things sorted out at service level, before a proposal 
reaches the Cabinet and the College. The SG, being the watchdog over efficient and 
smooth policy making, aims to keep as much coordination as possible upstream, in 
order to reduce the work load of the College. And DGs generally prefer solving open 
points themselves, because at political level “the solutions that they come up with 
are more […] sort of superficial, political solutions.” (interview COM 057, also 127). 
Thus, if points are discussed at political level, services risk products of months or 
even years of intense drafting to be simplified or downluted ‘upstairs’. However, we 
also find examples where points are deliberatively kept open to lead to discussion at 
the political level. This may be the case where a DG considers that its Commissioner 
has a better chance to assert the DG’s position (interview COM 021, 080, 093, 115).  
For our argument it should be noted that certain practices introduced in order to 
simplify the work of an ever growing Commission should lead to biased 
aggregation. Only a selection of all DGs is actually consulted in the formal ISC. And 
where a formally consulted DG fails to respond within the given deadline, this is 
treated as agreement to the document despite the respective DG maybe having had 
                                                        
8 First bilaterals among the lead and the disapproving DG follow. If they cannot achieve an 
agreement, the SG steps in and has meetings with the respective parties in order to settle the 
dispute (interview COM 65). 
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disagreed. In sum, the extant organisational structures systematically privilege the 
lead department as well as the SG as firsts among equals in the process of the 
Commission forming a common position. In the following section the roles of the SG 
and the lead department will be addressed in more detail. 
 
3.1.1. The Secretariat General 
The SG plays an increasingly important monitoring role throughout the whole 
internal coordination. Since the Kinnock reforms, and even more so with the Barroso 
term, the SG enforces early ‘upstream coordination’, by now one of the guiding 
principles of the current Secretary General Catherine Day (interviews COM 015 and 
066). It aims at early steering and screening of the internal processes in order to 
prevent conflicts appearing at later stages of decision making, and consequently 
strengthens the role of the SG as the Commission’s watchdog. To achieve this, the SG 
has introduced the post of ‘policy coordination officials’ looking “at the preparation 
of the documents, the quality of the documents and the internal coordination, in 
other words, that all associated or concerned DGs have been properly consulted” 
(interview COM 066), “so that things do not come jumping on the agenda from one 
DG which the others do not know about, have not heard about completely” 
(interview COM 017, also COM 046). To this aim SG officials have various means at 
their disposal: They may attend inter-service group meetings or may step in 
whenever they deem it necessary to stop the process, to give it a steer or to act as a 
broker when conflicts occur (interviews COM 015 and COM 057). 
Further, the SG plays a pivotal role in assigning the lead DG for a legislative 
proposal. Often this is self-evident. Yet, this is not the case for all acts, especially not 
for more cross-cutting and overarching projects, aiming at solving some of today’s 
most pressing societal problems.9 The assignment is part of the long-term Strategic 
                                                        
9 For example, in case of the famous REACH directive the responsibility for the dossier was 
handed back and forth between DG ENV and DG ENTR. 
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Planning and Programming (SPP) cycle of the Commission managed by the SG.10 As 
part of the SPP, the operational annual Commission’s Legislative and Work 
Programme (CLWP) defines the concrete initiatives to be launched and which DG is 
going to be lead, described as “a very bottom-up process” (interviews COM 015 and 
066). However it also, and increasingly so over time, entails a very hierarchical 
component. After bilateral talks, where the SG and the President’s Head of Cabinet 
receive the respective Director-General and discuss the items that the DG proposes, 
the SG ultimately decides about the timing and more importantly about priorities, 
necessary cooperation and ‘non’-initiatives (interviews COM 066 and COM 015). 
Thus, the SG is in a distinguished position in setting policy priorities on the internal 
agenda and influencing how much say a policy portfolios has in a certain legislative 
drafting.  
 
3.1.2 Lead Department 
The lead department, the DG primarily responsible for the drafting of a document, is 
in the strong position of the agenda-setter putting down a first version of a proposal 
that is to be launched. Thus, it can largely determine the frame and focus of a 
legislative objective (cf. Mörth, 2000). The institutional rules allow the lead 
department to influence the aggregation of positions by channelling the informal and 
formal involvement of other DGs. In the interviews conducted so far, we find 
considerable variance in a lead department’s decision to allow for co-drafting of 
another service or to rather inform others at a very late stage, as far as obviously 
cross-cutting issues are concerned (interviews COM 059 & COM 015). And in the 
subsequent formal written inter-service consultation it is the lead that decides which 
policy DGs are consulted. 
Moreover, the lead DG has the choice to integrate the comments of another service or 
to attach them and leave them open for discussion at political level, where different 
                                                        
10 It was introduced with the ‘Activity Based Management’ of the Kinnock reforms in 1999 / 2000 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2000: 13-17). 
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logics and resources are decisive. Thereby it can deliberately choose the decision-
making venue that is most beneficial to its aims – however the available 
opportunities prescribed are by the structure and rules governing the process.  
 
3.2. Political Coordination 
The political coordination of a legislative draft starts after the transferral of the 
document from the services to the Commissioners and their Cabinets. In terms of 
political coordination one can distinguish between first, different procedures – i.e. 
whether a proposal is adopted in written or in oral procedure – and second, between 
different coordinative steps. A written procedure is initiated by the SG at the request of 
one or more Members of the Commission. All Cabinets receive copies of the 
agreement and have the opportunity to respond before a given deadline, otherwise 
their agreement is assumed. If they have objections, however, they enter into 
bilateral talks and if no consensus can be achieved this way, the initiative is decided 
under oral procedure (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). 
In an oral procedure, horizontal coordination on the political level takes place in 
three consecutive negotiation fora: the ‘Special Chefs’ meetings, the Heads of Cabinet 
meetings (Hebdo), and the College meetings. A Special Chef is attended by Members 
of all Commissioners’ Cabinets who have the responsibility within their Cabinet for 
the subject matter concerned, and is chaired by a Member of the President’s Cabinet. 
The weekly Hebdo takes place on Mondays, is chaired by the SG and follows the 
same agenda as the College meeting following two days later. In these meetings 
Heads of Cabinet seek to achieve consensus on as many points as possible. If they 
unanimously agree on a document, it is treated as ‘A point’ in the subsequent 
College meeting, which means an agreement without actual discussion of the 
Commissioners. If no agreement can be achieved in the Hebdo, the document is 
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handed to the College as a ‘B point’ for oral discussion.11 Here, formally, the 
Commissioners take decisions by simple majority (Art. 219 TEC), but actual voting in 
the College is in practice very rare.12 In addition to discussions in oral procedures, the 
College may also discuss open points of written procedures that the previous levels 
could not solve. In general, the earlier stages of the horizontal coordination on 
administrative and political level are considered an effective clearing house 
mechanism, trying, before the proposal gets to the table of the College, that the major 
issues are solved” (interview COM 046, also COM 058). 
Looking through our analytical lenses it is important that some of the measures 
introduced to facilitate decision taking in an enlarged Commission challenge the 
unitary actor assumption – hereby allowing some actors to be more influential in the 
internal position formation process than others. This is the case where one or more 
Commissioners are entitled to take decisions in the name of the whole College via 
the – albeit rarely used – empowerment procedure or the subdivision of the 
Commission into thematic Groups. Thematic ‘Groups of Commissioners’ composed 
of ca. 5 to 10 Commissioners and set up by the President are another more recent 
feature to simplify the work of an enlarged Commissioner (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2005: Annex, Art. 18)..  
To sum up, the coordination of position formation within the EU Commission has 
proven to be an increasingly, but still only partially formalized process. As well the 
administrative as the political coordination processes leave considerable leeway in 
drafting a policy proposal, providing for a multitude of access points for interactions 
among the DGs. Further, the organisational structures and practices seem to favour 
certain actors, most notably the President’s Secretariat General and the lead 
                                                        
11 Related to administrative decisions the ‘delegation procedure’ exists, which defers from the 
collegiality principle by assigning exclusive responsibility to a subgroup of Commissioners 
(Spence, 2006a). 
12 Egeberg (2006b: 8) quantifies the phenomenon to 8-10 formal votes per year in the Prodi 
Commission as opposed to hundreds of yearly decisions. The Delors Commissions were 
characterised by more actual votes than ever before or after (Peterson, 1999: 53). The opposite 
seems to be true for the Barroso Commission with no formal vote taken until November 2009 
(interview COM 113). 
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department. This may possibly lead to a biased aggregation of diverging positions 
when the Commission forms a common position, as the next section will show. 
 
4. Balanced or biased aggregation? 
Our findings have indicated that we must expect considerable variation in actor 
positions for any given legislative proposal. We have further shown that the internal 
coordination structures yield different weight to different actors in the process of 
forming the agenda the Commission sets. In this section we substantiate our 
argument by presenting empirical evidence on DG variance in legislative output, in 
level of decision making and in DG interaction. 
4.1. Empirical evidence on legislative output 
As sketched above, a DG acting in the role of the lead department has structural 
advantages in putting its position through where diverging opinions among the 
internal actors of the Commission emerge. On a more aggregate level this means that 
the overall legislative output of the Commission may be skewed towards those DGs 
that act more frequently as the lead department than others. Figure 2 provides the 
relative output of the different DGs across instruments of European secondary 
legislation for the period 2004 to 2008. 
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Figure 2: DG shares in legislative output by legislative instrument (2004-2008) 
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Figure 2a: Regulations (N=805) 
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Figure 2b:Directives  (N=297) 
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Figure 2c: Decisions (N=709) 
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First of all, the emerging picture clearly shows that the different actors within the 
Commission contribute to a vastly varying extent to the number of legislative 
initiatives proposed by the Commission as a whole.13 Regarding regulations in figure 
2a, acts which are binding in their entirety and directly applicable throughout the 
Union, the largest share of about 32% is drafted by DG TRADE closely followed by 
the about 13% proposed by DG MARE. Both DGs, however, hold rather specific 
mandates so that one may argue that the scope of their output – for example as 
measured by the number of directly affected citizens – is rather limited as compared 
to DGs with broader policy responsibilities. 
The variance among other policy DGs depicted in the left panel of the figure is 
comparatively less pronounced with the notable exception of DG AGRI (about 8% of 
Commission output). Though their share is small, it should also be noted that the 
horizontal services such as the Secretariat General (SG) or the Legal Service (SJ) also 
take responsibility in leading the drafting of 2 and 4 %, respectively, of the 
regulations proposed by the Commission. 
Further, figure 2b shows the distribution of primary responsibility among internal 
Commission actors for directives. This instrument of European legislation is also 
binding in its entirety but leaves room to member states how to transpose it into 
national law. Here, a fewer number of Commission services contribute to 
Commission output at all. Looking at the policy DGs first, we see that the output of 
DG MARKT (internal market) more than doubles that of DG EMPL (employment, 
social affaires and equal opportunities). If the structural advantages of being lead are 
exploited, this would clearly favour the position of DG MARKT in the overall 
Commission output. The most eye-catching observation in figure 2b is the large share 
of the Legal Service (SJ). This horizontal service accounts for almost one quarter of 
directives proposed by the Commission. One potential origin of this observation is 
the Better Regulation agenda of the Commission under which the Legal Service is 
                                                        
13 Note, that it may be that those DGs having more supranational competences also produce more 
legal acts and are more often in the lead position. As DGs’ portfolios are not as clear cut as the 
Treaty text, however, and in many cases it is difficult to ascribe a level of competence to a DG per 
se, we abstain from introducing a measure. 
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active in codifying and simplifying extant legislation. Nevertheless, significant policy 
effects may emerge from the large number of directives primarily drafted in this 
horizontal service. 
Lastly, the picture for decisions – an instrument that directly addresses individuals, 
firms, or member states individually and thus is somewhat more limited in scope – 
in figure 2c also tells its own story. The DGs concerned with external relations are 
more prominently represented and account together for about 35% of the 
Commission’s overall output on this legislative instrument. Within the policy family, 
the DG for taxation and customs union (TAXUD) provides the largest piece of the 
pie, followed by environment (ENV) and agriculture (AGRI).  
While final conclusions without sufficient theoretical backing and focus on legislative 
competences would be premature, the overall picture does not provide for a 
perception of a Commission that systematically balances its overall output across the 
internal actors it is made up of. Rather, the varying frequencies of being primarily 
responsible for a proposal must be expected to move the overall Commission 
position to the benefit of some and at the expense of others. 
 
4.2. Empirical frequencies of interaction at the political level 
Empirical evidence on coordination at the political level (section 0) suggests that only 
13.2% of all Commission proposals between 2004 and 2008 were actually negotiated 
in the College.14 In other words, a rather large share of legislative proposals was 
already agreed among the services prior to the political level. Figure 3 shows that the 
variation in the likelihood with which a proposal was negotiated in the College 
varies with the DG that was primarily responsible. 
                                                        
14 The period chosen is left censored by the availability of data on the College decision procedure 
in the PreLex database. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of DG proposals decided by oral procedure (2004-2008) 
 
Notes: Overall number of proposed acts during the period provided in brackets. 
Source: Author compiled data from the PreLex database. 
 
Without case by case knowledge about the acts we can not conclude whether this is 
related to differing shares of political sensitive acts proposed by different DGs 
(interview COM 118). Yet, we do have evidence that the likelihood of having a 
proposal discussed among the Commission’s political leaders varies clearly among 
the DGs.15 DG INFSO and DG REGIO both have half of their proposals discussed in 
College while there is a broad midfield of policy DGs where the proposals reach the 
political level in about one third of the cases. This comprises education and culture 
(EAC), employment, socials affairs and equal opportunities (EMPL) as well as 
internal market (MARKT). The proposals of others, in contrast, are less often 
discussed at political level (DG AGRI, MARE and TRADE). They may either induce 
less political conflict, may be less cross cutting in nature or can be more easily 
resolved between the administrative actors for other reasons. 
                                                        
15 DG COMP, the service with the highest rate of proposals discussed orally, only drafted two 
proposals in the period shown. 
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In line with chapter 0 on the internal coordination processes the proposals drafted by 
DGs that reach oral procedure more often should present, ceteris paribus, more 
settlements along party political or nationality driven cleavages (cf. section 0). If the 
proposal reaches the political level we may also expect that functional and sectoral 
concerns play a minor role compared to proposals finalised at the administrative 
level. In turn, for proposals from the group of DGs where discussions in the College 
are less likely, we may expect sectoral and administrative conflict lines to play a 
relatively larger role (cf. sections 0 and 0). In the next section we turn to the 
dimension of DG interaction and consider how the systematic DG interaction during 
the drafting process looks in empirical terms. 
 
4.3. Empirical evidence on overall DG interaction 
Uncovering patterns of systematic DG interaction is difficult, as the Commission 
withholds respective data from the public.16 Based on data on ‚associated’ DGs, 
figure 4 provides a map of legislative drafting in the year 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 After 2000 the SG has stopped publishing those services that contributed to the drafting of a 
proposal in one way or the other.  
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Figure 4: Mapping legislative interaction among DGs in 2000 
 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis indicates the absolute number of proposals a DG was primarily responsible for in 2000 (lead DG). The x-axis, in-turn, 
shows the absolute frequency with which a DG contributed to a proposal without being in the lead (associated DG). Further, links 
describe relationships between two specific DGs where outgoing arrows indicate that the origin DG had the lead in the interaction 
while incoming arrows indicate that the DG served as an associate in this relationship. Finally, the width of this links reveals the 
frequency with which both DGs interacted in legislative drafting during 2000. 
Source: Author compiled data from the PreLex database. 
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We distinguish the different types of secondary legislation. On the vertical axis, the 
internal Commission actors are ordered by the absolute frequency of being lead 
department. The horizontal axis, in turn, denotes the absolute frequency with which 
a DG was associated to specific drafting processes. The arrows indicate interactions 
between specific DGs and are the wider the more often these two DGs have worked 
together on a legislative proposal. 
First of all, the figure confirms what has been assumed before: Interaction between 
the departments of the European Commission is the norm rather than the exception. 
For all three legislative instruments, the variation across the frequency of being 
associated to a proposal is higher than the variation in being the primarily 
responsible department. This is hardly surprising as responsibility presumably 
involves much more effort than being associated. Nevertheless the figure indicates 
that nearly all DGs do influence proposals primarily drafted by other DGs and that a 
lot of interaction takes place. This emphasises that one must not only look at the 
positions of the internal actors, but also at the coordination structures that monitor 
the various actors in order to understand the agenda the Commission sets.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The lack of attention paid to structure and “bureaucratic politics” (Allison, 1969; 
Hammond, 1986) in explaining the Commission’s agenda was the starting point for 
our paper. Combining literature from the area of organisational studies and agenda 
setting in the EU with empirical information on internal Commission decision-
making we address these weaknesses. By concentrating on the Commission’s 
organisational structure and its institutional rules we argue that their ignorance 
ultimately risks to inadequately conceptualise EU decision-making more broadly. 
Only where we take the internal structure into account we can fully understand the 
Commission’s agenda; that is “the set of issues receiving serious consideration” 
(Princen, 2009: 21) the Commission feeds into the inter-institutional process. What is 
more, the choice of inter-institutional venues, such as Council formations or 
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Parliamentary committees, typically arises from this interaction within the 
Commission. And, how issues are asserted in the internal process influences the 
degree of conflict or the interaction modus of actors involved in the inter-institutional 
process.  
The look inside the Commission reveals that its internal actors – the Directorates-
General – are remarkably diverse in mandates, administrative setup and resources. 
Accordingly, we can assume them to hold diverging positions on most policy 
problems which then have to be coordinated in order to generate a common 
Commission position. Uncovering the respective coordination structure, however, 
leads to the conclusion that certain actors are favoured over others. Most notably, at 
the Commission’s administrative level the lead department can influence the number 
and constellation of other internal actors that may have influence on its initial 
legislative draft. What is more, in the case of conflict with other Directorates-General 
this department can decide whether the diverging positions should be resolved at the 
administrative or at the political level of the Commission. Hereby, it can select the 
internal arena that will produce its most favoured outcome. 
Comparably skewed influence grants the internal structure of the Commission only 
to the Secretariat-General, a DG that is politically led by the Commission President. 
Through the more recent mechanisms of impact assessments and programming, this 
service can interfere early on in the process at administrative level. Next to assigning 
the lead department, it may intervene in the lead department’s discretion in 
assigning other internal actors - and thus issues, frames and different interests – to a 
particular proposal. However, whether this has a balancing effect remains to be seen 
and should be a question of further empirical research. 
All in all, Schattschneider’s (1960: 30) dictum that “organization is itself a 
mobilization of bias in preparation for action” appears to hold for Europe’s central 
agenda-setter. Our descriptive data on empirical variation of internal actors’ 
involvement in decision-making speaks against a perception of a Commission that 
can systematically balance its overall output across the varying interests of the 
internal actors it is made up of. Even at the most basic level, we find variation in the 
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frequencies with which DGs act as a lead department for proposed pieces of 
legislation, in the frequencies with which DG proposals are debated at the political 
level, and in the patterns of interaction between different DGs.  
Admittedly, a pure recourse to these structural variables is only one part of the story. 
While structurally privileged positions within the Commission add to our 
understanding, they remain somewhat bloodless as long as we do not link them to 
relevant policy issues and dimensions – such as market liberalization versus 
regulatory intervention – and complement them with other power resources internal 
Commission actors might hold. Nonetheless, this paper shows that future research 
needs the organisational structure and the internal rules of the European 
Commission as an indispensable building block in explanations of the EU’s political 
agenda. 
Hartlapp, Metz & Rauh 
        
27 
References    
Allison, G. T. (1969) Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political 
Science Review, 63, 689-718. 
Baumgartner, F. R. & Jones, B. D. (1993) Agendas and instability in American politics, University of 
Chicago Press  
Baumgartner, F. R. & Mahoney, C. (2008) Forum Section: The Two Faces of Framing: Individual-
Level Framing and Collective Issue Definition in the European Union. European Union 
Politics, 9, 435-449. 
Commission of the European Communities (2000) Reforming the Commission. A White Paper. 
COM(2000)200. 
Commission of the European Communities (2004) Functioning of the Commission and internal 
coordination. SEC(2004)1617/4. 
Commission of the European Communities (2005) Commission Decision of 15 November 2005 
amending its Rules of Procedure (2005/960/EC, Euratom). Official Journal, L, 83–90. 
Commission of the European Communities (2006) Rules of Procedure of the impact Assessment 
Board ("Board"). 
Commission of the European Communities (2008) Guide de la procédure à suivre pour le 
traitement des consultations interservices. Internal working document. 
Daviter, F. (2009) Schattschneider in Brussels: How Policy Conflict Reshaped the Biotechnology 
Agenda in the European Union. West European Politics, 32, 1118 - 1139. 
Döring, H. (2007) The Composition of the College of Commissioners: Patterns of Delegation. 
European Union Politics, 8, 207-228. 
Egeberg, M. (1995) Bureaucrats as Public Policy-Makers and Their Self-Interests. Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 7, 157-167. 
Egeberg, M. (2006a) Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the 
College of European Commissioners. Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 1. 
Egeberg, M. (2006b) Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the 
College of European Commissioners. Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 1-15. 
Fouilleux, E., de Maillard, J. & Smith, A. (2005) Technical or political? The working groups of the 
EU Council of Ministers. Journal of European Public Policy, 12, 609 - 623. 
Hammond, T. H. (1986) Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics. 
American Journal of Political Science, 30, 379-420. 
Harcourt, A. J. (1998) EU Media Ownership Regulation: Conflict over the Definition of 
Alternatives. Journal of Common Market Studies, 36, 369-389. 
Hartlapp, M. (2010, forthcoming) Cross-sectoral coordination in the European Union: Organising 
exit from the joint-decision trap. IN Falkner, G. & Scharpf, F. W. (Eds.) The EU's Joint-
Decision Trap and its Exits. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Kassim, H. (2004) A historic accomplishment? The Prodi Commission and administrative reform. 
IN Dimitrakopoulos, D. (Ed.) The Changing European Commission. Manchester, UK, 
Manchester University Press. 
Lowi, T. (1972) Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice. Public Administration Review, 32, 
298-310. 
Lowi, T. J. (1964) Review: American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory. 
World Politics, 16, 677-715. 
Mörth, U. (2000) Competing frames in the European Commission - the case of the defence 
industry and equipment issue. Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 173 - 189. 
The agenda set by the EU Commission 
 
   
 28 
Peterson, J. (1999) The Santer era: the European Commission in normative, historical and 
theoretical perspective. Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 46 - 65. 
Princen, S. (2009) Agenda-Setting in the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave. 
Princen, S. & Rhinard, M. (2006) Crashing and creeping: agenda-setting dynamics in the 
European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 1119 - 1132. 
Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy Research 
(Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy), Westview Press. 
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960) The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America, 
Austin, TX, Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Schön, D. A. & Rein, M. (1994) Frame reflection. Towards the resolution of intractable policy 
controversies, New York, Basic Books. 
Schout, A. & Jordan, A. (2008) The European Union's governance ambitions and its administrative 
capacities. Journal of European Public Policy, 15, 957 - 974. 
Spence, D. (2006a) The Directorates General and the Services. Structures, Functions and 
Procedures. IN Spence, D. & Edwards, G. (Eds.) The European Commission. London, John 
Harper. 
Spence, D. (2006b) The Directors General and the services: structures, functions and procedures. 
IN Spence, D. & Edwards, w. G. (Eds.) The European Commission. London, John Harper. 
Tholoniat, L. (2009) The Temporal Constitution of the European Commission: A timely 
Investigation. Journal of European Public Policy, 16, 221-238. 
Trondal, J., Marcussen, M., Larsson, T. & Veggeland, F. (2009) Administrating International 
Organisations. Rules, roles and routines in international bureaucracies. The 
Transformation of the Executive Branch of Government in Europe. ARENA, Oslo. 
Wonka, A. (2007) Technocratic and independent? The appointment of European Commissioners 
and its policy implications. Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 169 - 189. 
Hartlapp, Metz & Rauh 
        
29 
Annex: Groups of Commissioners 
The Lisbon Group 
 • President (Chair) 
 • Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry 
 • All Commissioners may participate in this group 
The Competitiveness Council Group 
 • Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry (Chair) 
 • Commissioner for Science and Research 
 • Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection 
 • Commissioner for Competition 
 • Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services 
 • Commissioner for Trade 
The External Relations Group 
 • President (Chair) 
 • Commissioner for External Relations (Vice Chair) 
 • Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs 
 • Commissioner for Enlargement 
 • Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 
 • Commissioner for Trade 
 • Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget (ad hoc basis) 
The Fundamental Rights, Anti-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities Group 
 • President (Chair) 
 • Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security (Vice Chair) 
 • Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication 
Strategy 
 • Commissioner for Administration, Audit and Anti-fraud 
 • Commissioner for Information Society and Media 
 • Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism 
 • Commissioner for Enlargement 
 • Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 
 • Commissioner for External Relations 
 • Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities 
The Communications and Programming Group 
 • Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication 
Strategy (Chair) 
 • Commissioner for Transport 
 • Commissioner for Information Society and Media 
 • Commissioner for Regional Policy 
 • Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget 
 • Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism 
 • Commissioner for Trade 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2004: Annex). 
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